Christians tend to be behind the curve on different things. Yet as soon as Christian apologists figured out that the law of transitivity of identity and/or Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals proves what we all knew in our hearts to be true, many of these apologists came up with a quick answer.
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If A = C, and if B = C (where “=” signifies the relation of identity), then A = B. For example, if Samuel Clemens is the one man who invented Huck Finn, and if Mark Twain is the one man who invented Huck Finn, then Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.
On a different yet related note, if A = B, then whatever is true of A is true of B. For example, if Y'shua is Jesus, and if Y'shua is the Messiah, then Jesus is the Messiah; and if Y'shua is Jesus and if Jesus is the Messiah, then Y'shua is the Messiah--no exceptions.
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Now, Christian apologists know this rule, and many of them have been confronted with the true (!) statement that if F = G and S = G, then F = S --or rather that if the Father is identical with the one god that exists and if the Son is identical with the one god that exists, then the Father is (identical with) the Son. One thing they have done in response is to take a sentence on the order of “The Word was God”--as in John, chapter one and as in common Christian parlance--and then have the boldness to treat the noun “God” as if it is a predicate noun both in Koine Greek John 1.1 and in common parlance. Translation: they take the noun “God” and they treat it like an adjective, all such that John’s sentence “The Word was God” may as well be rendered as the sentence “The Word was divine.”
And that’s supposed to be their solution to the problem: to boldly make a noun to be an adjective. Now, let’s assume for a moment that this analysis of “theos” is faithful to Greek grammar and that this analysis of Modern English “God” is faithful to English grammar and pragmatics. Okay, so John 1.1 may as well be rendered “...The Word was divine”--but so what? One could also aptly use the word “divine” in speaking of the attributes or properties that God has--God has divine properties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Those properties are divine, yet those properties’ being divine do not make them to be as great as the Father; so what follows is that Jesus’ being divine (in the sense of the word in question) do not necessarily make him to be equal with the Father or as great as the Father, despite the whole intention of Christian apologists in drawing attention to the idea of a predicate noun in the first place. What this means, in turn, is that the possibility that John expresses the proposition in John 1.4 that the Word is the one god that exists does remain; likewise, it follows that Christians perhaps unwittingly and unintentionally do contradict themselves with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity.
Yet there is another attempt at a solution to the problem raised by the nature of the identity relation. I have actually seen people equivocate and use four-term fallacies in order to save face for popular, contemporary emphases on the doctrine of the Trinity which revolve around sentences like “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” I have actually seen people argue like this:
(1) I am human.
(2) Billy Graham is human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.
The argument involves and depends on equivocation. It’s understood by rules of common parlance that “to be God” is a grammatical construction formed with the equative copula “be” and the noun “God.” Yet it is also understood that “to be human” involves the use of an adjective (not to mention the predicate “be”). (Compare: “To err is human.”) So the argument depends on a false analogy.
Yet there is a similar argument:
(1) I am a human.
(2) Billy Graham is a human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be a human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.
More or less of a four-term fallacy. One knows good and well for there to be an analogy, the contestant has to go all the way to say what he did not have the courage to say; if premise (4) is to stand, and if the argument is to be valid, then premise (5) must be changed as follows:
(5′) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be a god.
So what the argument would end up suggesting, in a modified form, is that the Father is a god, the Son is a god, and that the Father is not the Son. Okay, so how many gods are there, anyway? Answer: one. But that means that the Father is the one god that exists, and that the Son is the one god that exists, and consequently that the Father is the Son, a proposition which Christian apologists try avoid.
Yeah, such are the pitfalls of trying to mix and dabble with all the different functions and meanings of the verb be (which are listed in any decent dictionary, though perhaps not the more recent usage which even makes “be” to mean cost in certain contexts). The attempts really do not seem to work.
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Finally, one last problem with the attempt to render “God” as a predicate noun when Christians say “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” Presumably, they base their believe that F and S = G on the Scriptures themselves. Well, guess the Scriptures have to say about this matter of predicate nouns: they suggest that the premise of the predicate noun cannot save the day. Consider the following:
So, score one for the Oneness Pentecostals or other naysayers in this case, because up to a certain point they are correct on this issue: contemporary expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity do have a problem. Of course, that is not to say that the problem cannot be explained away, but equivocation, four-term fallacies, and false analogies are no legitimate means of making the problem go away.
*******
If A = C, and if B = C (where “=” signifies the relation of identity), then A = B. For example, if Samuel Clemens is the one man who invented Huck Finn, and if Mark Twain is the one man who invented Huck Finn, then Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.
On a different yet related note, if A = B, then whatever is true of A is true of B. For example, if Y'shua is Jesus, and if Y'shua is the Messiah, then Jesus is the Messiah; and if Y'shua is Jesus and if Jesus is the Messiah, then Y'shua is the Messiah--no exceptions.
*******
Now, Christian apologists know this rule, and many of them have been confronted with the true (!) statement that if F = G and S = G, then F = S --or rather that if the Father is identical with the one god that exists and if the Son is identical with the one god that exists, then the Father is (identical with) the Son. One thing they have done in response is to take a sentence on the order of “The Word was God”--as in John, chapter one and as in common Christian parlance--and then have the boldness to treat the noun “God” as if it is a predicate noun both in Koine Greek John 1.1 and in common parlance. Translation: they take the noun “God” and they treat it like an adjective, all such that John’s sentence “The Word was God” may as well be rendered as the sentence “The Word was divine.”
And that’s supposed to be their solution to the problem: to boldly make a noun to be an adjective. Now, let’s assume for a moment that this analysis of “theos” is faithful to Greek grammar and that this analysis of Modern English “God” is faithful to English grammar and pragmatics. Okay, so John 1.1 may as well be rendered “...The Word was divine”--but so what? One could also aptly use the word “divine” in speaking of the attributes or properties that God has--God has divine properties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Those properties are divine, yet those properties’ being divine do not make them to be as great as the Father; so what follows is that Jesus’ being divine (in the sense of the word in question) do not necessarily make him to be equal with the Father or as great as the Father, despite the whole intention of Christian apologists in drawing attention to the idea of a predicate noun in the first place. What this means, in turn, is that the possibility that John expresses the proposition in John 1.4 that the Word is the one god that exists does remain; likewise, it follows that Christians perhaps unwittingly and unintentionally do contradict themselves with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity.
Yet there is another attempt at a solution to the problem raised by the nature of the identity relation. I have actually seen people equivocate and use four-term fallacies in order to save face for popular, contemporary emphases on the doctrine of the Trinity which revolve around sentences like “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” I have actually seen people argue like this:
(1) I am human.
(2) Billy Graham is human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.
The argument involves and depends on equivocation. It’s understood by rules of common parlance that “to be God” is a grammatical construction formed with the equative copula “be” and the noun “God.” Yet it is also understood that “to be human” involves the use of an adjective (not to mention the predicate “be”). (Compare: “To err is human.”) So the argument depends on a false analogy.
Yet there is a similar argument:
(1) I am a human.
(2) Billy Graham is a human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be a human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.
More or less of a four-term fallacy. One knows good and well for there to be an analogy, the contestant has to go all the way to say what he did not have the courage to say; if premise (4) is to stand, and if the argument is to be valid, then premise (5) must be changed as follows:
(5′) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be a god.
So what the argument would end up suggesting, in a modified form, is that the Father is a god, the Son is a god, and that the Father is not the Son. Okay, so how many gods are there, anyway? Answer: one. But that means that the Father is the one god that exists, and that the Son is the one god that exists, and consequently that the Father is the Son, a proposition which Christian apologists try avoid.
Yeah, such are the pitfalls of trying to mix and dabble with all the different functions and meanings of the verb be (which are listed in any decent dictionary, though perhaps not the more recent usage which even makes “be” to mean cost in certain contexts). The attempts really do not seem to work.
*******
Finally, one last problem with the attempt to render “God” as a predicate noun when Christians say “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” Presumably, they base their believe that F and S = G on the Scriptures themselves. Well, guess the Scriptures have to say about this matter of predicate nouns: they suggest that the premise of the predicate noun cannot save the day. Consider the following:
26 And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: [then] came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace [be] unto you. 27 Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust [it] into my side: and be not faithless, but believing. 28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. 29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed [are] they that have not seen, and [yet] have believed. (John 20.26-29, KJV)Apparently, Jesus is denoted by the word “God” in each passage. And the word “God” in these passages clearly are neither adjectives nor predicate nouns. To the contrary, this word is clearly used as a token of the identity relation in these passages.
Simon Peter, a bondservant and apostle of Jesus Christ, To those who have obtained like precious faith with us by the righteousness of our God and Savior Jesus Christ: (2 Peter 1.1, NKJV)
So, score one for the Oneness Pentecostals or other naysayers in this case, because up to a certain point they are correct on this issue: contemporary expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity do have a problem. Of course, that is not to say that the problem cannot be explained away, but equivocation, four-term fallacies, and false analogies are no legitimate means of making the problem go away.
