The Trinity, Accuracy and Crypto-Modalists

What follows concerns the post The Discernment Gap: Showing a Lack of Passion for God's Honor and Glory at the AOMin Blog.

I am not totally sympathetic with Dr. White here for one reason: he and most other trinitarians themselves are not as accurate as they could and should be concerning the doctrine(s) of the Trinity. For example, Dr. White writes:

When asked if God manifests Himself in three ways, or exists in three divine Persons, he said that "neither one of them totally get it for me." Now there is a ringing profession of Trinitarianism if I ever heard it.

And later:

Ah yes, we need to outgrow this need for accuracy in what we teach about God…err, I mean, theological hair splitting. Let's outgrow it so that we can tell the world about…well, just what are we supposed to tell the world about? Oh yes, Jesus! But, what if they ask who Jesus was and is? As soon as we respond we will be engaging in…well, theology, right? Was Jesus two persons, a manifestation of the one God, the Father and the Son? Did Jesus pre-exist? And what did He come to accomplish? Make men savable, or actually save His people from their sins (Matt. 1:21)? Oh my, it seems that to have anything to say to the world we need to do this theological hair-splitting, which, of course, is another way of saying "honoring God by carefully handling His Word, testing our traditions, and holding fast to that which is good and just and honorable and true." It says volumes about what some people think evangelism is that they can so denature the message and still think they are speaking the truth.

Presumably Dr. White would rather TD Jakes say “God exists in three divine Persons” while also calling for people to be accurate in both ideas and verbal expressions of those ideas. Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, so how is it justifiable to say that God “exists in three divine Persons”? The adposition “in” is a locative preposition--in other words, it is a preposition that speaks of locations. So again, how accurate is it to suggest that basic trinitarian doctrine is this: that there are these three divine persons here and that God exists in and occupies the space which these three divine persons also occupy? Does that sound like trinitarian theology to you? It does not, yet that is precisely what the doctrine of the Trinity should be if common statements like “God exists in three divine Persons” and “Within the Godhead are three distinct persons” are accurate and precise.

Meanwhile, you might be remembering that it is merely the prototypical use of the word “in” that is locative in function and meaning; after all, the word is sometimes used to indicate instrumentality and other things (e.g. “The message was written in blood”). This observation about the use of the word “in” may be interesting, but in this case it is irrelevant. For it is clear that trinitarians subconsciously are thinking in terms of location when they say “God exists in three divine Persons,” because by analogy there is also the statement “Within the Godhead are three distinct persons” where the locative preposition “within” is used. So it hardly seems to be the case that “God exists in three divine Persons” means God exists at any and all given times as the three divine persons when most people say this, if someone were to assert this in White’s defense.

Again, it is clear that virtually no one is expressing the proposition that God exists at any and all given times as the three divine persons when they say “God exists in three divine Persons,” because if this is what trinitarians had in mind when they say this then they would have become fully aware of the seeming incoherence of the Trinity vis-à-vis Leibniz and the transitivity rule of identity long, long ago and would demonstrate an awareness of this as do only a very limited number of trinitarians. What that means is that the average trinitarian has a fuzzy concept of God’s trinitarian nature. And if the average trinitarian has a fuzzy concept of God’s nature, can the same be true of TD Jakes and other supposed crypto-modalists? Either way, Jakes and White are practically in the same boat.

And yes, fuzziness condemns and kills. Has everyone now heard of Michael Sudduth’s conversion to Hinduism?

Progress in Trinitarian Apologetics and Theology

A while back I had posted this, having arrived at my final conclusions independently of various works of other individuals: “The Trinity, Marriage, and Relative Identity.” As proof of how distracted and out of touch I’ve become in recent times, the following just came to my attention; the first link below is just a hat tip:

Analytic Theology, et cetera. | The Prima Facie Problem of the Trinity --> Section 3 of Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology: “The Trinity.

Michael Rea is someone else who has borrowed from the Paradox of Constitution and also mentions attempts of other people at using the concept of relative identity to tie up loose ends in Christian theology or apologetics. So, it may well be that Christians are increasingly unwilling or unable to deceive themselves and others by proffering irrelevant, convoluted, circular or nonsensical “explanations” of how Trinitarian doctrine is coherent--at least not the “explanations” that we hear all the time about three forms of water, or the “is of predication,” etc.

Then again, perhaps speak too soon: who else but people involved in analytic Christian philosophy really understand and appreciate the need to at least be thinking about matters of metonymy, relative identity, laws of identity, etc. regarding the Trinity? Answer: virtually no one. For this I blame our very imperfect society which disallows and discourages one’s acquiring the means to understand the world around him.*

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* Consider the waste of both taxpayers’ money and students’ time in public high schools in America. For example, if you went to one of these schools you probably took English classes all four years you were stuck in high school. And what exactly did you do, read, or learn during those four years of English classes? You already knew how English grammar worked. You already knew how to spell words. So, what did you study during all those four years of English? The grammar of Old English? The relationship between English and other Germanic languages (e.g. German, Frisian, Dutch)? Middle English grammar? Rhetoric? Public speaking? Etymology or word origins (useful for those going into technical fields like medicine)? Linguistics? Logic? No, you read stories, had discussions, were forced into monologues before your classmates without being taught rhetorical methods, and you read up on Greek mythology.

Two years of your life were wasted, because during that time you could have been getting the equivalent of a minor concentration BA degree in Philosophy, Linguistics, or other fields of study. Instead, you sat and read White Fang and learned to love the idea of revenge, or you read Beowulf and learned about creatures that did not even exist. And what good do these things do if you now have neither the time, money, or excuse to study that which helps you to help yourself and others fully appreciate what is going on in the sixty-six books of the Holy Bible, to name just one important thing?

The Trinity, Marriage, and Relative Identity

Submitted for your reading pleasure, for Thanksgiving break...

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So, let’s go back to two earlier issues that have arisen in this blog. Let’s also do this by way of a common path in addressing the matter of relative identity. Because if it is true that the relation of identity is not absolutely subject to the rule of transitivity, and if it is true that it is possible for objects X and Y to be the same object F but not same object G, then certain matters of Christian and biblical theology just became that easier to grasp.

To establish some context, the reader may recall the following past blog entries:

Monday, April 19, 2010
“Challenge for Trinitarians”
http://bright-idea.blogspot.com/2010/04/challenge-for-trinitarians.html

(Cf. Monday, April 26, 2010
“Challenge for Anti-Trinitarians, Part 1”
http://bright-idea.blogspot.com/2010/04/challenge-for-anti-trinitarians-part-1.html

Monday, May 03, 2010
“Challenge for Anti-Trinitarians, Part 2”
http://bright-idea.blogspot.com/2010/05/challenge-for-anti-trinitarians-part-2.html)

Saturday, October 02, 2010
“About David's Census”
http://bright-idea.blogspot.com/2010/10/about-davids-census.html

Linked to:
SEP: “Relative Identity¨
First published Mon Apr 22, 2002; substantive revision Mon Nov 5, 2007
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/

Wednesday, October 27, 2010
“A Difficult Teaching”
http://bright-idea.blogspot.com/2010/10/difficult-teaching.html

The two issues in question are: 1) the supposed logical and metaphysical impossibility of the biblical teaching of the divinity and co-distinctiveness of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and 2) the bodies of a man and his wife being one in number. The would-be downfall of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the difficult marital teaching was this: the Rule of Transitivity of the relation of identity.

The Scriptures apparently hold that each of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (the names of whom we will abbreviate as F, S, H, respectively) is distinct from the other and that each is God, where the noun phrase “God” is a subject complement and not a camouflaged adjective of any sort. What do we know about identity? If an A is C, and if B is C, then A is B. Again, if les États-Unis are the United States and if los Estados Unidos are the United States, then les États-Unis are los Estados Unidos: this is something which is perfectly clear to see. So where we abbreviate the name “God” with “G,” if F is G and if S is G--and don’t lie to yourself--then F is S according to the transitivity rule of identity.

The same problem arises with married couples. Christ said that a man and wife are no longer two but one, and if we are to take the words of Christ at face value or are to take his words literally--as is required in any hermeneutic enterprise until the possibilities that words were meant to be taken literally are exhausted--then we have a problem. For it is clear that when the body of Barack Obama stands behind a teleprompter to give a speech while the bodies of wife and children have every appearance of being located elsewhere on the stage or on the earth, there are two distinct objects involved, even two distinct bodies. Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals creates the problem, because if Barry is Michelle and if Barry is behind the teleprompter, then according to the rule it must be that Michelle is behind the teleprompter. However, we will see later that the law is quite possibly defeasible in instances of this sort if we want to hold to the idea that the bodies of a man and his wife are one in number and not two.

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So once again, what are some facts of identity or something’s being identical with something else?

(1) A is A.
(In other words, everything is identical with itself.)

(2) If A is identical with B, then every property of A is a property of B, and vice versa.
(In other words, if A and B are the same thing, then whatever is true of A is true of B, and vice versa; likewise, whatever quality A possesses is also possessed by B, and vice versa.)

(3) (Except where subject to qualification) The relation of identity is transitive. If A is C, and if B is C, then A is B.
(In other words, if Jesus’ Father is God, and if Jesus is God, then apparently Jesus is Jesus’s Father.)

(1) is the Law of Identity and its validity is incontrovertible. (2) is pretty much Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals and it supports (3). (3) is the rule of transitivity which is thought to bind or govern the identity relation.

The validity of the transitivity rule is to be granted. For starters, remember that language is a matter of the signifier and the signified. With that said, consider the statement “A is B.” If the name “A” refers only and precisely to an object φ and if the name “B” refers only and precisely to an object φ, then there just is only one denotation of the two names: φ. In other words, A necessarily is B and B necessarily is A since A and B are I-related (i.e., identity-related) in that there is precisely, only, and commonly one object which they denote.

Because the transitivity rule of identity is to be granted, guess what you get with the following sentences:

(4) The Father is God.
(5) The Son is God.
(6) The Spirit is God.

Or if any trinitarian will not admit that there is trouble for trinitarianism here, let’s reduce those sentences to symbolic logic, with the attendant reminder, for example, that the Bible apparently affirms not merely that Jesus and the Spirit of Jesus are equal with God but identical, as in John 1.4 or Acts 5.3-4:

(4') F = G
(5') S = G
(6') H = G

On the transitivity rule, F = S = H, which clearly is not orthodox.

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In philosophy it is often useful to examine language and the ways in which we speak of different matters of ontology, mereology, epistemology, and so forth. In fact, it is useful to think of the identity relation as being a linguistic or semiotic relation, but only up to a certain point. The foregoing account of trinitarian doctrine and the transitivity of identity is a semiotic one, and there are shortcomings in a mere semiotic account of identity.

[DB, Semiotics contrasts with semantics in being the study of the words and such that convey meanings or connotations. ;) ]

Number one, how does a mere semiotic account explain the Law of Identity? After all, when we stop to contemplate the Law of Identity and affirm it we are not asserting that a name, N, refers to what it refers to. To the contrary, it is clear that in those instances what we have in mind is that an object, φ, is φ--our concern is one of raw metaphysics and not language.

Number two, suppose you point at two physical objects (such as two coffee mugs) resting on your desktop and assert that one is the other. Regardless of whether your assertion is veridical or jibes with reality, it is clear that your concern in this case is not a semiotic one and also that you are not employing any novel or unconventional concept of identity in the process.

Number three, a mere semiotic account of identity reduces the Father, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit to mere names of a common object, something which is hardly supported by the entirety of the Scriptures.

Having considered these problems, what would it mean to point to a physical object with your right hand and to assert that it is another physical object that you point out with your left hand? Transitivity could not begin to apply to the two physical objects, as it were, or to any additional and third object if the assertion were true. This is because Leibniz’s law, which is metaphysical and concerned with the properties of objects, still holds true such that you have no diversity or plurality of objects to which transitivity could apply.

What all of this means is that the transitivity rule of identity apparently holds in language and symbolic logic, but not beyond language and symbolic logic. In terms of the realities of raw metaphysics or ontology, which are the foundation of language in the first place, the rule binds nothing.

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So the transitivity rule of identity apparently cannot rightly be used to deny the doctrines of the Trinity. It remains entirely possible that F = G and S = G while F ≠ S. Of course, if one affirms that F = G and S = G while F ≠ S then he affirms the idea of relative identity, according to which X and Y can be the same φ though not the same ψ. Someone might invoke Occam’s razor to claim that the Scriptures themselves are proof that relative identity exists, at least in the case of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. Apart from that, strong proofs of the existence of relative identity seem rather elusive. However, a tentative case can be made with the paradox of constitution.

Take a piece of clay that has no remarkable or special shape or form. Now take that entire quantity of clay and fashion it such that the piece of clay that now has a shape exactly like that of a man, with various constituent atoms or matter in various locations relative to one another: the piece of clay is now a statue. Now take a mallet and smash the statue. By doing so, you will have destroyed the statue, but it bears noting that at the same time you have not destroyed the piece of clay.

The piece of clay is the piece of clay. The statue is the piece of clay. The piece of clay is the statue. The statue is an object, O, which the piece of clay is not. Stated in another way:

C = C
S = C
S = O
C ≠ O

Compare:

F = G
S = G
H = G
F = O1 (“O1” meaning an object which S and H are not)
S = O2
H = O3
F ≠ S; S ≠ H; F ≠ H

Notice that the thought experiment of the piece of clay is carefully worded. The piece of clay does not merely take the form of a man or of a statue. To the contrary, in virtue of the piece of clay’s having a shape exactly like that of a man it just is a statue. Meanwhile, it is clear that a statue is destroyed when it is smashed with a mallet. At the same time, it bears noting that in the thought experiment the piece of clay begins as an object which has no remarkable or special shape or form and persists even after it obtains a special shape. Therefore, the piece of clay is not destroyed by any stroke of a mallet, though the statue is. Consequently, it seems difficult to conceive that the thought experiment or its conclusions suffer from some sort of language defect or some sort of “vague” or “misleading” use of vernacular speech. No, the vernacular means of speaking of destruction and constitution seems quite straightforward in this instance, and so there seems to be at least one intuitive example of relative identity.

So with a dismissal of the transitivity rule of identity in matters of metaphysics or ontology, we discovered what we already knew to begin with: that it is entirely possible that each of F, S, H is G while F, S, H are distinct from each other. With the would-be paradox of constitution, we see again that it is entirely possible that each of F, S, H is G while F, S, H are distinct from each other. Of course, no one believes that either F, S, or H is a physical or mental construct of any sort, yet the paradox only bolsters and supports the re-evaluation of the transitivity rule.

Now let’s see what happens if we try to account for trinitarian proof texts by means of the concept of relative identity. In the ontological realm, when two objects are I-related--and let’s stop right there, because there can be no naïve relation of identity between two distinct objects in extra-linguistic world; instead, identity by definition means having only one object in question though it may carry two different names. Then again, in the ontological realm when objects are R-related (i.e., when the relation of relative identity obtains between the objects) A and B will be the same X, but not the same Y. Again, A and B will be the same X, but not the same Y.

A and B will be identical with some common object (this object perhaps being either A, or B, or some third object), though at the same time there is at least one object A is though B is not or at least one object B is though A is not. In the case of the piece of clay, the piece of clay was the statue and vice versa, though apparently the statue was something which the piece of clay was not, for one object was destroyed while the other was not destroyed. Therefore, the piece of clay and the statue are R-related to each other while there is yet a third object somewhere in the picture, regardless of whether or not it is readily discernible. In the case of F, S, and H, it is likewise the case that certain objects (e.g., S and G) apparently are identical while there is a third object which one of the two is while the other is not (cf. the doctrines that G is F though F is not S).

So, relative identity is possible, and it appears to support the propositions that each of God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is the one god that exists while each is also distinct from each other.

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If a piece of clay and a statue are R-related in the paradox of constitution, then it follows that such may well be the case with human beings. Consider a human body for example. It seems entirely fair (though every matter of philosophy is doomed to remain forever controversial to some degree) to say reductionistically that a zygote is a particular amount or body of matter, regardless of its being a vessel of a soul or spirit. This zygote, or rather this body of matter, will undergo radical changes in its career. If all goes normally, the body of matter will increase in size over the course of nine months and its shape will undergo radical changes of shape, but the body of matter persists nonetheless as opposed to ceasing to exist upon any would-be change that it undergoes.

Now suppose the worst and that this body of matter perishes at an age of ten months and is later incinerated. The human being is destroyed in the process, but that particular amount or body of matter is not. Come rain or shine or fire or any other condition, all the constituent atoms of that body of matter persist, even if their locations relative to one another become as counterintuitive or as strange as the relative locations of the United States or the minuscule letter “i,” which both consist of disparate parts. What follows from our thought experiment is that the body of each of us is never alone; instead, it may well be that we have two of them even if one of them is not readily discernible.

With that said, let’s revisit some texts that we earlier looked at. It is written:

1 And he arose from thence, and cometh into the coasts of Judaea by the farther side of Jordan: and the people resort unto him again; and, as he was wont, he taught them again. 2 And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away [his] wife? tempting him. 3 And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? 4 And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put [her] away. 5 And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. 6 But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. 7 For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; 8 And they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. 9 What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. 10 And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same [matter]. 11 And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. 12 And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery. (Mark 10.1-12)

Again:

3 The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? 4 And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made [them] at the beginning made them male and female, 5 And said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? 6 Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. 7 They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? 8 He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. 9 And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except [it be] for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery. 10 His disciples say unto him, If the case of the man be so with [his] wife, it is not good to marry. 11 But he said unto them, All [men] cannot receive this saying, save [they] to whom it is given. 12 For there are some eunuchs, which were so born from [their] mother's womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were made eunuchs of men: and there be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive [it], let him receive [it]. (Matthew 19.3-12)

So Matthew 19 and Mark 10 speak of acts of remarriage which constitute acts of adultery. The texts also raise the following question: How does remarriage constitute adultery since the divorced person presumably is no longer married? For the time being, let’s try to answer this question with the naïve set of assumptions which most of us have concerning the texts: that the identity relation is always transitive and that the word “one,” as used in the texts above of a man and his wife, is merely figurative in meaning.

On the naïve view, remarriage or acts resulting from remarriage can be adultery only in virtue of the following: either a divinely irrevocable married status or a divinely irrevocable oneness of married couples. The former disjunct seems not to be an option, since it seems as though people who divorce do end their marriages and are unmarried right after they obtain a divorce. John 4.1-18 also seem to support this assessment (just as it is entirely unlikely that the Samaritan’s five former husbands were all dead at that time).

So marriages apparently end even when neither a husband nor a wife dies, and that means that adultery in this case must be a violation of oneness of an earlier marriage, which is a problem. It is a problem because the naïve view treats the word “one” in this case as being figurative in meaning: it ends up meaning close instead of one. Yet people who divorce each other clearly are no longer close in the sense of the Mt 19 and Mk 10 passages; they are neither physically nor emotionally nor sociologically close in whatever sense could exist in these passages. So the naïve view on the one hand must treat the adultery problem as a violation of erstwhile oneness while on the other hand it cannot possibly affirm that such oneness is possible. Therefore, the naïve view must be incorrect and cannot account for all the details of Mt 19.3-12 and Mk 10.1-12.

However, you get a solution to the problem if you assume that some particular relation of relative identity exists between married couples. The piece of clay and the statue overlapped in space and time, and perhaps two bodies for every human person also overlap in space and time. When someone marries, one of those two bodies ceases to be distinct in quality or in number from a body of another person who has just experienced an analogous change of being. In the case of the piece of clay and the statue, there turned out to be a third object which one object was while the other was not and which was meanwhile more or less indiscernable. In the case of married couples, some more or less indiscernable objects are those which become one in number while the two distinct bodies which we all see with our own two eyes are analogous to the piece of clay and the statue which we likewise see with our own two eyes. Consequently, it would have to be the case that the kind of people that Christ speaks of in Mt 19.3-12 and Mk 10.1-12 is not that which we see with our own eyes but rather the “hidden” physical bodies; otherwise, the appeal to relative identity is thus far ineffective.

So there it is: a bunch of things to consider, along with possible implications of 1 Corinthians 6.15-17. Food for thought and grounds for further research, to borrow from Emory.

Challenge for Anti-Trinitarians, Part 2

Those who oppose the basics of the doctrine of the Trinity on the grounds of biblical hermeneutics have no good reason to feel smug and confident. Their alternatives to the doctrine are no better than the doctrine at issue.

For instance, let’s take a kind of modalism that would suggest the following:

1) At different moments in cosmic history, the object or entity which the Bible denotes “Jesus” has been any object or objects which the Bible refers to with the noun phrases “Father,” “Son,” “the Holy Spirit.”

2) Jesus is God.

3) In the Scriptures Jesus is not simultaneously the Father and Son, or Father and Holy Spirit, or Son and Holy Spirit.

Certain presuppositions are central both to this sort of modalism and to trinitarianism. Both sides on the issue would agree with the following:

(1) Only one god exists (Isaiah 44.6), no god existed prior to this particular object, and no god will exist after this object (Isaiah 43.10).

(2) In the Scriptures there is an object named “the Father” which is also named “God” (e.g., see 1 Corinthians 1.9, 1 Thessalonians 1.1; cf. Matthew 6.9-15).

(3) In the Scriptures there is an object named “the Son” which is equal with “God” (e.g., see John 5.18, John 8.58), which created the cosmos (John 1, Colossians 1, 1 Corinthians 8.6), and which is called “God” (e.g., John 1.1).

(4) In the Scriptures there is an object named “the Holy Spirit” that possesses attributes held only by an object which is intelligent and which is God (Acts 5.3-4, 1 Corinthians 6.19).

However, the problem for the modalists is that to the contrary one finds both the co-existence and co-distinctiveness of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the Scriptures.

1) The Holy Spirit and the Son are co-existent and co-distinct:

· Malachi 3.6

If Jesus is God and if God sometimes is the Father, at other times the Son, and at other times the Holy Spirit, though never simultaneously, then God changes. The book of Malachi tells us that God does not change. Therefore, the form of modalism in question does not square with reality.

· Matthew 3.16

The text does not state that Jesus saw himself descend upon himself; the text likewise does not state that Jesus saw himself descend upon nothing. To the contrary, the text states that Jesus “saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting upon Him.” Meanwhile, a thing cannot descend upon itself as surely as it is incoherent to speak of a thing’s descending upon something which does not exist at the moment. Therefore, one can rightly say that the man Jesus and the Spirit are distinct and that they exist simultaneously.

· Matthew 4.1

The text states that the Spirit then led the man Jesus into the desert. Yet how can something be led by something that does not exist at the moment--or more precisely, how can something be led by nothing and still be led by something? It cannot.

2) The Holy Spirit and the Father are co-existent and co-distinct:

· Malachi 3.6

If Jesus is God and if God sometimes is the Father, at other times the Son, and at other times the Holy Spirit, though never simultaneously, then God changes. The book of Malachi tells us that God does not change. Therefore, the form of modalism in question does not square with reality.

· John 14.26

The text states that the Father would send the Holy Spirit. Yet how does it make any sense to send something that does not exist--or more precisely, how does it make sense to send nothing and at the same time send something? After all, God is not the Spirit when he is the Father, right?

· Romans 8.26-27

The text states that the Spirit intercedes for believers. One important thing to remember all the while is that intercession necessarily involves three distinct parties or individuals. So, to whom does the Spirit graciously intercede on the behalf of sinners? Presumably, he intercedes to the Father if only to one member of the Trinity. Now then, how does one intercede to a thing or being that does not exist at the moment? Moreover, why would one intercede to something that does not exist, thus directing his petitions to precisely no one?

3) The Father and the Son are co-existent and co-distinct:

· Malachi 3.6

If Jesus is God and if God sometimes is the Father, at other times the Son, and at other times the Holy Spirit, though never simultaneously, then God changes. The book of Malachi tells us that God does not change. Therefore, the form of modalism in question does not square with reality.

· Matthew 10.32-33

These verses make no sense in the context of modalism. You don’t deny things before someone who does not exist when you exist.

· Matthew 23.9

Who said that the Father “is” in heaven? The Son did.

· John 1.1 (cf. v.14)

An object cannot be with itself, and it cannot be with something that does not exist at the moment either.

· John 5.30: “I can of mine own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge: and my judgment is just; because I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me.”

One does not simultaneously send something that does not presently exist--i.e., nothing--and send something that exists.

· John 8.38

The very idea of seeing something with someone that does not exist when you exist is incoherent.

· Hebrews 7.22-25

The text states that the Son intercedes for believers. One important thing to remember all the while is that intercession necessarily involves three distinct parties or individuals. So, to whom does the Son graciously intercede on the behalf of sinners? Answer: The Father. Now then, how does one petition a thing or being that does not exist at the moment? Why petition something that does not exist thus directing your petitions to precisely no one?

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Meanwhile, modalism is akin and similar to what one could call a sort of conflationism to be found among Oneness Pentecostals. Consider the following from “Doctrine - 60 Questions on the Godhead” at http://www.upci.org/doctrine/60Questions.asp:

15. Did the prophet Isaiah say that Jesus would be the Father? Yes. Isaiah 9:6; 63:16.

Actually, the correct answer to this question is no. If the Son of Man would later become the Father, then God will have changed. However, Malachi 3.6 informs us that God does not change. On the other hand, if the Son’s becoming the Father simply involves the Father’s leaving a physical body behind never to indwell it again, then the Son of Man was never anything more than a physical body in which God dwelled, which means that the Son of Man was never God, which is in direct contradiction to John 1.1 which tells us that the Son of Man both was God and was with God in the beginning.

Likewise, Hebrews 7.22-25 states that the Son intercedes for believers. One important thing to remember all the while is that intercession necessarily involves three distinct parties or individuals. So, to whom does the Son graciously intercede on the behalf of sinners? Based on the context of Hebrews 7.22-25 you don’t want to say that the answer is the devil or anyone else but, yes, God the Father. But you cannot have the Son interceding to God the Father in the UPC theology at issue, because on that view the Son and the Father are identical and not distinct.

Finally, it was never clear in the first place that either Isaiah 9.6 or especially Isaiah 63.16 indicated that Jesus would be the Father. Isaiah 9.6 itself (KJV) reads as follows:

For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace.

Let’s be generous here and pretend as if “Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace” in the verse are not names but descriptions. Okay, when exactly has anyone ever gone around calling Jesus of Nazareth by the description “Wonderful” or by the description “Counselor”? Of course, the fact that a practice of calling the Son of Man by the descriptions “Wonderful” or “Counselor” is virtually or entirely non-existent shows that there is more to Isaiah 9.6 than initially meets the eye.

In fact, given the common practice of referring to persons by the name or label “Father” in speaking of non-paternal relationships--as with 1 Samuel 24.11, 2 Kings 6.21 or Catholic priests--reminds us that the Son of Man is indeed a father to many people in some sense, without his being the object denoted in the likes of 1 Thessalonians 1.1 by the noun phrase “God the Father.” And it bears noting that the definite article preceding “everlasting Father” appears in the KJV though not in various other renderings of Isaiah 9.6 as its use apparently is not required by Hebrew grammar.

More from UPCI:

46. If God and the Holy Ghost are two separate persons, which was the Father of Christ? Matthew 1:20 says that the Holy Ghost was the Father, while Romans 15:6, II Corinthians 11:31, and Ephesians 1:3 say that God was the Father. There is no contradiction when we realize that God the Father and the Holy Ghost are one and the same Spirit. Matthew 10:20; Ephesians 4:4; I Corinthians 3:16.

The author is obviously joking here, for anyone who has read the Bible knows that God is a god of means and agency such that the following words--“But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost”--need not indicate anything contrary to the idea that on behalf of the Father the Holy Spirit caused Mary to become pregnant just as in Hebrews 1.1-2 God creates the world through his Son.

Meanwhile, the appeal to Matthew 10.20 makes no sense at all (doesn’t X of Y normally mean that X and Y are distinct?), and the appeal to 1 Corinthians 3.16 likewise makes no sense (can there not be two entities present within, and does temple of X necessarily mean that X is present within that temple, as in “temple of Athena”?).

Even the appeal to Ephesians 4.4 does not work. If the unspoken assertion being made by the author is that there is only one spirit, then what are we to make of the following?

2 And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness [was] upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. (Genesis 1.2)

1 And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 2 See, I have called by name Bezaleel the son of Uri, the son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah: 3 And I have filled him with the spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship, (Exodus 31:1-3)

Let the LORD, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man over the congregation, (Numbers 27.16)

And this did she many days. But Paul, being grieved, turned and said to the spirit, I command thee in the name of Jesus Christ to come out of her. And he came out the same hour. (Acts 16.18)

And the man in whom the evil spirit was leaped on them, and overcame them, and prevailed against them, so that they fled out of that house naked and wounded. (Acts 19:16)

Or if the assertion is that there is only one spirit in heaven that we should be concerned with, then why would the apostle Paul make us mindful of spirits who are with the Lord after they die?

6 Therefore [we are] always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: 7 (For we walk by faith, not by sight:) 8 We are confident, [I say], and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. 9 Wherefore we labour, that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him. 10 For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things [done] in [his] body, according to that he hath done, whether [it be] good or bad. (2 Corinthians 5.6-10)

21 For to me to live [is] Christ, and to die [is] gain. 22 But if I live in the flesh, this [is] the fruit of my labour: yet what I shall choose I wot not. 23 For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better: 24 Nevertheless to abide in the flesh [is] more needful for you. (Philippians 1.21-24)

Moreover, since the text of John 14.26 states that the Father would send the Holy Spirit, should we really overthink this simple verse to start interpreting it to mean that God will send himself? As if God says to himself, “Myself, I therefore send you to help my people on earth”?

Furthermore, since the text of Romans 8.26-27 states that the Spirit intercedes for believers, and since intercession necessarily involves three distinct parties or individuals, are we really supposed to believe that the Spirit intercedes for believers to anyone else but God the Father, who supposedly is identical with the Spirit?

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If one does the math then he will see that doctrines which rival the doctrine of the Trinity have more problems than the basic doctrine of the Trinity.

Challenge for Anti-Trinitarians, Part 1

Those who oppose the basics of the doctrine of the Trinity on the grounds of biblical hermeneutics have no good reason to feel smug or confident in their theology. Their alternatives to the doctrine are no better than the doctrine at issue. In fact, these alternatives are riddled with various problems.

Certain presuppositions are central both to trinitarianism and semi-Arianism. Moreover, both sides on the issue would agree with the following:

(1) Only one god exists (Isaiah 44.6), no god existed prior to this particular object, and no god will exist after this object (Isaiah 43.10).

(2) In the Scriptures, there is an object named “the Father” which is also named “God” (e.g., see 1 Corinthians 1.9, 1 Thessalonians 1.1; cf. Matthew 6.9-15).

Meanwhile, semi-Arianists who believe that the Father is God but believe that Jesus neither is God nor is divine in any sense would agree with the following:

(3) In the Scriptures, there is an object which is denoted by “Son” and “Jesus” and which is neither equal with nor identical with the Father.

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There is no shortage of evidence that both Jesus and his apostles believed that Jesus was equal with the object denoted by the word “God” if not also identical with the object denoted by the word “God.” Nonetheless, some people may not be able to believe this because of certain Scriptures which at first glance seem to run contrary to this truth.

(1) And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? none [is] good, save one, [that is], God. (Luke 18.19)

Some people will take the words of this verse to amount to a contradistinction of God and Christ or to a denial on the part of Christ that he is God. Now, one thing that is often lost in treatments of this verse is that the interpretation in question places one in a strange position of having to explain just how it is that Jesus is not good. For it seems incredible that Jesus was not a good person.

Nevertheless, isn’t Jesus, who is mentioned in this passage, the same person who says in John 8.24, “I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am [he], ye shall die in your sins”? Could it be that the words Jesus spoke in Luke 18.19 set the rich man up such that he would acknowledge or become aware of the divinity of Christ? This is plausible even before we stop to ask the question of whether or not Jesus was not a good person.

(2) Then answered Jesus and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. (John 5.19)

Even if we were to interpret this verse to be an indication of inability on the part of Christ, so what? For starters, what does the apostle Paul say in Philippians 2.5-11 but the following?

5 Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: 6 Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: 7 But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: 8 And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. 9 Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: 10 That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of [things] in heaven, and [things] in earth, and [things] under the earth; 11 And [that] every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ [is] Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

So we can see that when the Word became flesh he humbled himself. In fact, the Philippians passage is to be compared with Mark 6.5-6:

5 And he could there do no mighty work, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed [them]. 6 And he marvelled because of their unbelief. And he went round about the villages, teaching.

All told, one does not need to posit that Christ was not divine in order to make sense of any of these passages. One should remember that many actions in this universe are intentional in nature. For example, to breathe is an unintentional and involuntary act, but to walk and to talk are both intentional actions. What this means, in turn, is that one has the ability to walk or talk only insofar as he has the intent to walk or talk--if you decide that you are not going to talk for the next two seconds and then hold that intention for the next two seconds, you can’t talk. Again, you can’t talk--your will and your intention not to talk hems you in and constrains you. So, with regard to both John 5.19 and Mark 6.5-6 it need only be the case that when the Word became flesh he had decided not to exercise all of his divine powers and abilities until he would later be exalted by God the Father and given a name which above every name.

(3) Ye have heard how I said unto you, I go away, and come [again] unto you. If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto the Father: for my Father is greater than I. (John 14.28)

So, one cannot be equal with God the Father while not also being as great as God the Father, right? Wrong. Barack Hussein Obama is some sense greater than I am as a regular American. (Indeed, even though I don’t like Barry Obama, I’m not going to go on national TV and demand that he personally hear my grievances like a certain woman from California during the Bush 43 years. The sitting President of the United States of America may be a servant of the people, but the office of the Presidency does bestow upon the man some level of dignity and greatness.) Likewise, Queen Elizabeth of the Great Britain is in some sense greater than Tony Blair is as a normal subject of the British Crown.

Of course, in this instance we speak of greatness of office or function, not of ontic or ontological greatness. Each one of these persons is a human being, nor more and no less deserving of basic human rights as the the other. Nevertheless, the office or function that each has makes for a various degrees of greatness in one sense of the term.

(4) 4 As concerning therefore the eating of those things that are offered in sacrifice unto idols, we know that an idol [is] nothing in the world, and that [there is] none other God but one. 5 For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be gods many, and lords many,) 6 But to us [there is but] one God, the Father, of whom [are] all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom [are] all things, and we by him. (1 Corinthians 8.4-6)

If the Corinthians passage indicates that there is only one god and that this god is the Father to the exclusion of the Son, then doesn’t it follow with equal force that there only one Sovereign or Potentate in heaven? Compare 1 Timothy 6.13-16:

13 I give thee charge in the sight of God, who quickeneth all things, and [before] Christ Jesus, who before Pontius Pilate witnessed a good confession; 14 That thou keep [this] commandment without spot, unrebukeable, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ: 15 Which in his times he shall shew, [who is] the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords; 16 Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see: to whom [be] honour and power everlasting. Amen.

It follows, but you don’t want to say that there is only one Sovereign or Potentate. So at the end of the day both passages plausibly reflect a practice of usually applying one epithet to one individual and another epithet to another individual. There are instances in the New Testament where Jesus apparently is denoted by the word “God”; however, in many more instances this word denotes the Father specifically. Likewise, the word “Lord” is typically used in the New Testament to denote Jesus in particular when not substituting the Tetragrammaton.

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Again, there is no shortage of evidence that both Jesus and his apostles believed that Jesus was equal with the object denoted by the word “God” if not also identical with the object denoted by the word “God.”

(5) In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2 The same was in the beginning with God. 3 All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. (John 1.1-3)

No one doubts that the Word in this passage is Jesus Christ. So, the apostle John teaches not only that Jesus is an uncreated object or entity, but also that Jesus is divine.

(Meanwhile, it would do no good to say, “No, Koine Greek grammar allows for John 1.1 to be translated as ‘...And the Word was a god.’” After all (and with reference to judges and idols notwithstanding), how many gods are there in the universe? Or do you really think that the words of Isaiah 44.6 and 43.10 were written in reaction to the belief that there were many capital-“G” gods in the universe, as if polytheist pagans really drew a distinction between little gods and big gods? Or on what principle do you draw a distinction between minuscule-“g” gods and majuscule-“G” gods, especially considering that the word “God” is often used as a proper noun in the Scriptures and is often used to denote the Creator, thus calling for the use of a capital letter in keeping with modern orthography conventions and in keeping with the modern tradition of capitalizing nouns and pronouns that denote the Creator? And how exactly can this distinction be justified vis-à-vis 1 Corinthians 8.4-6?)

(6) Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the sabbath, but said also that God was his Father, making himself equal with God. (John 5.18)

Whoever or whatever is equal with God is equal with God. If God is worthy of reverence and worship, then any object equal with God should also be worthy of reverence and worship. Or if God is eternal and all-powerful, then any object equal with God should also be eternal and all-powerful. The apostle John apparently teaches that Jesus is equal with God, and I leave it to the reader to form the right conclusion from this verse.

(7) 26 And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: [then] came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace [be] unto you. 27 Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust [it] into my side: and be not faithless, but believing. 28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. 29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed [are] they that have not seen, and [yet] have believed. (John 20.26-29)

From a standpoint of prosody or rhythm, it is highly unlikely that anyone would ever exclaim “My Lord and my God!” as one exclaims expletives in a moment of shock or surprise. On the other hand, considering the number of biblical passages which at least at first glance appear to teach that Jesus is divine, it is most likely that the apostle Thomas refers to Christ as his Lord and his God in the passage above. It bears noting, meanwhile, that the passage has no record of Christ’s having corrected Thomas for daring to refer to him as a god.

(8) 56 Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day: and he saw [it], and was glad. 57 Then said the Jews unto him, Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham? 58 Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am. 59 Then took they up stones to cast at him: but Jesus hid himself, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them, and so passed by. (John 8.56-59)

Say what you will about the Jews’ inability to believe in Christ and to understand everything that Christ said to them. However, the fact remains that the two parties did have conversations with each other such that basic rules of what would have been Hebrew or Aramaic grammar were still perfectly understood by both parties.

With that said, what is the likelihood that anyone will risk violation of cultural norms and mores in attempting to stone and kill a man for that man’s having merely asserted that before Abraham existed, this man existed and exists now? There have been re-evaluations of verse 58 above, ones which seize upon Greek grammar and treat present tense “eimi” as having a meaning which corresponds with the function of the perfect phase in Koine Greek. However, the validity of this reinterpretation becomes questionable given that no reputable modern translation agrees with it and given that it makes the chain of events related by John 8 to be more or less nonsensical.

So, something ticked off these individuals who attempted to stone Christ. However, you don’t get that kind of reaction from merely claiming to be very old. On the other hand, if someone makes a claim which essentially makes him out to be uncreated, it is reasonable to believe that people may take this as a claim of divinity. Meanwhile, the final words of verse 58 above certainly bring to mind those of Exodus 3.14 such that it may well be that Jesus claims to be divine in John 8.58.

(9) 5 Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: 6 Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: (Philippians 2.5-6)

(10) For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. (Colossians 2.9)

You do not have the fullness of divinity if you lack any part of it.

(11) 11 For the grace of God that brings salvation has appeared to all men, 12 teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in the present age, 13 looking for the blessed hope and glorious appearing of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, 14 who gave Himself for us, that He might redeem us from every lawless deed and purify for Himself [His] own special people, zealous for good works. (Titus 2.11-14, NKJV)

(12) Simon Peter, a bondservant and apostle of Jesus Christ, To those who have obtained like precious faith with us by the righteousness of our God and Savior Jesus Christ: (2 Peter 1.1, NKJV)

Compare:

(13) 1 God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, 2 Hath in these last days spoken unto us by [his] Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds; 3 Who being the brightness of [his] glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; 4 Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they. 5 For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son? 6 And again, when he bringeth in the firstbegotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him. 7 And of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire. 8 But unto the Son [he saith], Thy throne, O God, [is] for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness [is] the sceptre of thy kingdom. (Hebrews 1.1-8)

That’s all for now.

Challenge for Trinitarians

Christians tend to be behind the curve on different things. Yet as soon as Christian apologists figured out that the law of transitivity of identity and/or Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals proves what we all knew in our hearts to be true, many of these apologists came up with a quick answer.

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If A = C, and if B = C (where “=” signifies the relation of identity), then A = B. For example, if Samuel Clemens is the one man who invented Huck Finn, and if Mark Twain is the one man who invented Huck Finn, then Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.

On a different yet related note, if A = B, then whatever is true of A is true of B. For example, if Y'shua is Jesus, and if Y'shua is the Messiah, then Jesus is the Messiah; and if Y'shua is Jesus and if Jesus is the Messiah, then Y'shua is the Messiah--no exceptions.

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Now, Christian apologists know this rule, and many of them have been confronted with the true (!) statement that if F = G and S = G, then F = S --or rather that if the Father is identical with the one god that exists and if the Son is identical with the one god that exists, then the Father is (identical with) the Son. One thing they have done in response is to take a sentence on the order of “The Word was God”--as in John, chapter one and as in common Christian parlance--and then have the boldness to treat the noun “God” as if it is a predicate noun both in Koine Greek John 1.1 and in common parlance. Translation: they take the noun “God” and they treat it like an adjective, all such that John’s sentence “The Word was God” may as well be rendered as the sentence “The Word was divine.”

And that’s supposed to be their solution to the problem: to boldly make a noun to be an adjective. Now, let’s assume for a moment that this analysis of “theos” is faithful to Greek grammar and that this analysis of Modern English “God” is faithful to English grammar and pragmatics. Okay, so John 1.1 may as well be rendered “...The Word was divine”--but so what? One could also aptly use the word “divine” in speaking of the attributes or properties that God has--God has divine properties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Those properties are divine, yet those properties’ being divine do not make them to be as great as the Father; so what follows is that Jesus’ being divine (in the sense of the word in question) do not necessarily make him to be equal with the Father or as great as the Father, despite the whole intention of Christian apologists in drawing attention to the idea of a predicate noun in the first place. What this means, in turn, is that the possibility that John expresses the proposition in John 1.4 that the Word is the one god that exists does remain; likewise, it follows that Christians perhaps unwittingly and unintentionally do contradict themselves with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Yet there is another attempt at a solution to the problem raised by the nature of the identity relation. I have actually seen people equivocate and use four-term fallacies in order to save face for popular, contemporary emphases on the doctrine of the Trinity which revolve around sentences like “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” I have actually seen people argue like this:

(1) I am human.
(2) Billy Graham is human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.

The argument involves and depends on equivocation. It’s understood by rules of common parlance that “to be God” is a grammatical construction formed with the equative copula “be” and the noun “God.” Yet it is also understood that “to be human” involves the use of an adjective (not to mention the predicate “be”). (Compare: “To err is human.”) So the argument depends on a false analogy.

Yet there is a similar argument:

(1) I am a human.
(2) Billy Graham is a human.
(3) But I am not Billy Graham.
(4) So it is possible for two distinct objects to be a human.
(5) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be God.

More or less of a four-term fallacy. One knows good and well for there to be an analogy, the contestant has to go all the way to say what he did not have the courage to say; if premise (4) is to stand, and if the argument is to be valid, then premise (5) must be changed as follows:

(5′) So by analogy, it is possible for two distinct objects to be a god.

So what the argument would end up suggesting, in a modified form, is that the Father is a god, the Son is a god, and that the Father is not the Son. Okay, so how many gods are there, anyway? Answer: one. But that means that the Father is the one god that exists, and that the Son is the one god that exists, and consequently that the Father is the Son, a proposition which Christian apologists try avoid.

Yeah, such are the pitfalls of trying to mix and dabble with all the different functions and meanings of the verb be (which are listed in any decent dictionary, though perhaps not the more recent usage which even makes “be” to mean cost in certain contexts). The attempts really do not seem to work.

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Finally, one last problem with the attempt to render “God” as a predicate noun when Christians say “The Father is God, the Son is God...but the Father is not the Son.” Presumably, they base their believe that F and S = G on the Scriptures themselves. Well, guess the Scriptures have to say about this matter of predicate nouns: they suggest that the premise of the predicate noun cannot save the day. Consider the following:

26 And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: [then] came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace [be] unto you. 27 Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust [it] into my side: and be not faithless, but believing. 28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. 29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed [are] they that have not seen, and [yet] have believed. (John 20.26-29, KJV)

Simon Peter, a bondservant and apostle of Jesus Christ, To those who have obtained like precious faith with us by the righteousness of our God and Savior Jesus Christ: (2 Peter 1.1, NKJV)

Apparently, Jesus is denoted by the word “God” in each passage. And the word “God” in these passages clearly are neither adjectives nor predicate nouns. To the contrary, this word is clearly used as a token of the identity relation in these passages.

So, score one for the Oneness Pentecostals or other naysayers in this case, because up to a certain point they are correct on this issue: contemporary expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity do have a problem. Of course, that is not to say that the problem cannot be explained away, but equivocation, four-term fallacies, and false analogies are no legitimate means of making the problem go away.